Florida Supreme Court denies rehearing for lawyer disciplined for using trade name "Legal Experts."  [Added 8/31/10]

    The Florida Supreme Court previously issued an order disciplining Lawyer by enjoining him from using the term "Expert" or "Experts" in any ad or trade name, and placing him on probation for one year (with conditions that he attend the Bar's Advertising Workshop and have the Bar pre-approve his ads).  See Florida Bar v. Doane, __ So.3d ___, 35 Fla.L.Weekly S278 (Fla., No. SC08-1278, 5/20/2010), 2010 WL 1997127.

    Lawyer moved for rehearing.  The Court denied his motion.  Justice Lewis dissented, suggesting that the majority had "refus[ed] to reconsider that the factual basis for the majority's decision does not exist" and concluding that no discipline was warranted.  "On rehearing, the respondent demonstrated that the evidence in the record establishes that in all instances when he referenced his designation of 'Legal Experts' on the sign outside his office, his business card, and his website, the phrase 'Board Certified Civil Trial Lawyer' was included immediately below the trade name.  The respondent's inclusion of his specific certification specifically  negates any notion that his trade name was misleading to the public as stated to be the basis for discipline and effectively establishes his consistency with the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.  Respondent' s compliance with the rules is also supported by the fact that the grievance committee of The Florida Bar found no probable cause in this matter and there has never been a complaining party with regard to misleading the public."  Florida Bar v. Doane, __ So.3d ___ (Fla., No. SC08-1278, 8/26/2010) (on motion for rehearing).

Florida Supreme Court disbars rather than suspends lawyer for misusing law to hurt members of public for personal gain.  [Added 8/27/10]

    Lawyer leased a horse pasture from the Godwins, an elderly couple.  At the time the lease was entered, Lawyer and the Godwins discussed the possibility of Lawyer buying the property.  A handwritten addendum to the lease agreement stated that the parties "will thereafter negotiate an agreement" for Lawyer's purchase of the land.  Thereafter, Lawyer and the Godwins were unable to agree on a price.  Lawyer insisted that she had a contract to buy the property, rather than an agreement to negotiate.  Lawyer's attempts to acquire the property escalated.  She continued to contact the couple and their realtor and ultimately filed a purported "Lease Agreement and Agreement for Sale" in the county clerk's office 2 years later, thereby putting a cloud on the title and affecting potential buyers.  It was later determined that the document was a forgery.  The Godwins were forced to hire legal counsel in an attempt to resolve the problems created by Lawyer's actions.

    The Florida Bar brought disciplinary charges against Lawyer.  The referee recommended that Lawyer be found guilty of violating Rule 4-8.4(c) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and recommended a 90-day suspension.  The Bar sought Supreme Court review, arguing for a harsher discipline.  The Supreme Court agreed and disbarred Lawyer.

    Even though the referee found Lawyer guilty of only a single violation of Rule 4-8.4(c), the conduct involved "ongoing, continuous misrepresentations for several years."  The Court summarized:  "[Lawyer] misused her status as an attorney to harm the Godwins:  (1) by recording the fraudulent document in the clerk’s office, in order to tie up the Godwins’ property; (2) by asserting that the Godwins and their realtor would suffer for not complying with her legal claims; and (3) by forcing the Godwins to hire counsel to resolve the legal problems that Respondent created.  Even after being informed that the Godwins had hired counsel, Respondent continued to directly harass them.  This Court does not look favorably on those who use their standing as an officer of the court to deliberately harm others – especially when they intentionally hurt members of the public for their own personal gain.  Further, in the instant case, Mr. and Mrs. Godwin were seniors, and Mr. Godwin was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease.  [Lawyer] was preying upon this vulnerable couple."

    Two justices dissented, supporting a 3-year suspension as being "more in line with our precedent."  Florida Bar v. Hall, __ So.3d ___ (Fla., No. SC07-863, 8/26/2010).

Florida Supreme Court rejects suspension recommendation and instead disbars lawyer convicted of drug trafficking.  [Added 8/27/10]

    Lawyer had a drug problem:  he was "severely addicted to the drugs methamphetamine and M.D.M.A. (ecstasy).  For years prior to his arrest, drugs controlled his life."  Lawyer was arrested in 2004 following controlled buys involving a confidential source.  After buying small quantities of drugs from Lawyer over several months, the source then "requested that Respondent obtain an amount of the drug M.D.M.A. that far exceeded that which was usual or customary for Respondent to have in his possession."  Lawyer agreed.  The police raided Lawyer's home and arrested him.  He entered a plea agreement in 2006 and was adjudicated guilty of one felony count of trafficking of 10 grams or more but less than 200 grams of "Ectasy."  Upon conviction he was automatically suspended from the practice of law.

    The Florida Bar charged Lawyer with violating Rule 3-4.3 ("commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the act is committed in the course of the attorneys relations as an attorney or otherwise, whether committed within or outside the state of Florida, and whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor, may constitute a cause for discipline") and Rule 4-8.4(b) (lawyer shall not "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyers honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects").  Lawyer and the Bar submitted a guilty plea and consent judgment for a 3-year suspension.  The referee recommended acceptance.  "[D]espite the presence of substantial mitigation," the Supreme Court ruled that disbarment was the appropriate sanction.

    Lawyer's case involved drug trafficking and "there was no showing that [Lawyer] was incapacitated by his addiction."  The Court noted that "[w]e have not hesitated in the past to disbar Florida attorneys with felony convictions involving drug trafficking."  (Citations omitted.)  The Court did decide that "[a]lthough we do not find that the mitigating circumstances present in this case are sufficient to overcome the presumption of disbarment for a felony conviction, we do find that such mitigation is sufficient to justify making the order of disbarment effective, nunc pro tunc, to the date respondent was automatically suspended due to the felony conviction."

    Two justices dissented, and would have approved the recommendation of a 3-year suspension.  The dissent noted that "[a]lthough [Lawyer] pled guilty to the serious offense of drug trafficking, the overwhelming evidence in this case demonstrates that his misconduct stemmed from a severe addiction to drugs, did not arise from the practice of law, and resulted in no client harm."  Florida Bar v. Liberman, __ So.3d ___ (Fla., No. SC06-1874, 8/26/2010).

Florida Supreme Court imposes stricter discipline than recommended by referee in case involving conflict, competence, and misrepresentation.  [Added 7/14/10]

    Lawyer was charged by the Florida Bar with ethics violations arising from Lawyer's representation of a 17-year-old client.  On cross-petitions for review filed by Lawyer and the Bar, the Florida Supreme Court approved the referee's findings that Lawyer violated rules regarding competence (Rule 4-1.1), communication with clients (Rule 4-1.4(b)), conflict of interest (Rule 4-1.7(b), and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (Rule 4-8.4(d)).  The Court rejected a finding that Lawyer charged an excessive fee (Rule 4-1.5(a)).  The Court further concluded that the referee erred in not finding Lawyer guilty of misrepresentation (Rule 4-8.4(c)).  Finally, the Court rejected the referee's recommended discipline (a 90-day suspension) as too lenient and ordered Lawyer suspended for 6 months.

    Lawyer represented Client, a 17-year-old female, in connection with a potential federal court claim for unauthorized videotaping and distribution of her appearing in spring break activity.  Lawyer had less than 3 years practice experience, and no experience litigating in federal court.  Lawyer associated another law firm, and they signed a contingent fee agreement with Client.  Lawyer was to receive 9.6% of the gross recovery.  Later Lawyer advised Client to replace the first law firm with another firm.  Under the new contingent fee agreement, Lawyer was to receive 11.25% of the gross recovery.  Lawyer thereafter again advised Client to fire the second firm and hire a third law firm.  Under the contingent fee agreement involving the third firm, Lawyer was to get a still larger share of the recovery.  Subsequently the pattern was repeated with a fourth and then a fifth law firm.  Finally Client fired Lawyer and retained new counsel to pursue her claim.  Lawyer filed an action in federal court seeking fees from Client on a quantum meruit basis; he sought 45% of Client's recovery.

    The Court approved the referee's findings that Lawyer failed to provide competent representation (Rule 4-1.1), failed to sufficiently explain matters to Client in order for Client to make informed decisions (Rule 4-1.4(b)), and allowed his personal interest in a fee to delay the resolution of the case desired by Client and increased the cost to Client (Rule 4-1.7(b) and Rule 4-8.4(d)).

    The referee also found Lawyer guilty of charging an excessive fee.  The Supreme Court rejected this finding, stating:  "In recommending that [Lawyer] be found guilty of violating rule 4-1.5(a), the referee relied upon two facts – i.e., that the percentage of [Lawyer]’s fee increased with each subsequent hiring of a new law firm and that [Lawyer] sought 45 percent of the client’s recovery in his action for quantum meruit in federal court.  While the record supports these findings of fact, they are an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that [Lawyer]’s fee was excessive.  Moreover, the Bar did not present expert testimony to establish that [Lawyer]’s fee was unreasonable."

    The Court concluded that the referee erred in not finding Lawyer guilty of conduct involving dishonesty, misrepresentation, fraud, or deceit (Rule 4-8.4(c)).  The referee essentially found that "the Bar failed to present clear and convincing evidence establishing intent, a necessary element of the rule violation alleged."  The referee, however, misapplied the "intent" requirement.  To satisfy this requirement, the conduct need only be "deliberate or knowing."  As a result, the Court stated that "the referee erred as a matter of law when he required the Bar to establish dishonesty, misrepresentation, fraud, or deceit in order to prove intent.  We conclude that the Bar established the element of intent by clear and convincing evidence in the record, based upon [Lawyer]’s deliberate conduct in telling his client not to speak to the fired attorneys or she would owe them fees and that she would not have to pay the other lawyers."

    The Court also rejected the referee's findings regarding mitigating factors.

    Finally, the Court ruled that the recommended sanction of a 90-day suspension was too lenient and concluded that a 6-month suspension was the appropriate sanction.  Florida Bar v. Shankman, __ So.3d ___, 35 Fla.L.Weekly S445 (Fla., No. SC08-1107, 7/8/2010), 2010 WL 2680248.

Lawyer permanently disbarred, rather than suspended, for uncharged income tax evasion.  [Added 7/2/10]

    Lawyer was suspended for 91 days in 2009.  Subsequently the Florida Bar filed a formal complaint against Lawyer alleging failure to maintain required trust account records and failing to file income tax returns and pay income taxes from 1996 to 2006.  Lawyer had not been charged with or found guilty of a crime in connection with his failure to pay income taxes.  The referee recommended that Lawyer be found guilty of violating rules governing trust accounts (Rule 4-1.15 and various subdivisions of Rule 5-1.2).  Regarding the tax evasion count, the referee recommended that Lawyer be found guilty of violating Rule 3-4.3 (committing acts unlawful or contrary to honesty or justice) and Rule 4-8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  Lawyer recommended a 90 day suspension for the trust accounting violations and a 91-day suspension for the tax misconduct.

    The Florida Supreme Court approved the recommendations regarding guilt.  Despite the fact that neither Lawyer nor the Bar petitioned for review of the recommended sanction, the Court concluded that the recommended discipline was "far too lenient" and permanently disbarred Lawyer.

    The Court rejected Lawyer's assertion that the referee found he had a "good faith belief" that he was not required to file tax returns or pay taxes.  The Court stated:  "[Lawyer]'s argument that he may 'refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists' without violating rule 4-8.4 has its limits.  Where the claim asserted has been decisively rejected by the courts, the attorney can no longer maintain that his assertion of the claim is made in good faith and is not frivolous."

    The fact that Lawyer had not been charged with a tax-related crime was immaterial to the Court.  "We reject [Lawyer]'s argument that he cannot be prosecuted by The Florida Bar for violations of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar because he has not been prosecuted criminally for tax fraud or evasion.  Rule 3-4.4 expressly allows the Bar to initiate disciplinary action 'regardless of whether the respondent has been tried, acquitted, or convicted in a court for the alleged criminal offense.'  This language makes it clear that a disciplinary violation premised on a violation of law is separate from the initiation or outcome of criminal proceedings based on the same conduct."

    The Lawyer imposed permanent disbarment in part because Lawyer "declared at oral argument before this Court that he fully intends to maintain his current course of conduct, i.e., he will continue to not file federal income tax returns and to not pay federal income taxes on money he earns in his law practice, apparently until someone shows him a more definitive law or United States Supreme Court opinion that disabuses him of his faulty beliefs."  (Footnote omitted.)  The Court observed that "[s]uch a stance is anathema to an attorney‘s ethical obligation to respect and obey the law."  Florida Bar v. Behm, __ So.3d ___, 35 Fla.L.Weekly S419 (Fla., No. SC07-661, 7/1/2010), 2010 WL 2612335.

Conduct resulting in finding of no probable cause can be used as aggravating factor in disciplinary case, per Florida Supreme Court.  [Added 6/30/10]

    Lawyer was accused of ethical violations arising from the taking of a deposition.  A grievance committee found no probable cause with respect to all aspects of the conduct except for Lawyer's acts involving a laptop computer.  The Florida Bar filed a formal complaint against Lawyer regarding the laptop incident.  Lawyer was found guilty, and the referee recommended alternative sanctions of either disbarment or  2-year suspension with conditions.  Lawyer sought Florida Supreme Court review.

    The Supreme Court disapproved the recommendations as to sanctions "as not reasonably based on existing caselaw or standards [Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions]."  Instead, the Court suspended Lawyer for 60 days and ordered that he be publicly reprimanded.

    Lawyer argued that the referee erred in using as an aggravating factor the aspects of his conduct at the deposition for which the grievance committee found no probable cause.  Without citation, the Court rejected this contention.  "Contrary to the respondent’s argument, it is not necessary for misconduct to have been a basis for discipline in order for it to be considered in aggravation.  Here, the respondent’s pattern of engaging in abusive conduct is relevant to the appropriate sanction to be imposed for the violations at issue in this case.  We therefore reject the respondent’s argument regarding aggravation."

    It also appears that the Court may have permitted Lawyer's prior diversion to the Bar's practice and professionalism enhancement program to be considered in aggravation.  Evidence as to this event was introduced in the disciplinary hearing.

    Finally, in a footnote the Court agreed with the referee that Lawyer's conduct provided a "glaring example" of unprofessional conduct that should be shown to lawyers and law students for instructional purposes:  "The referee has suggested and we agree that members of the Bar and law students could view the video recording of the laptop incident in the context of a course on professionalism as a glaring example of how not to conduct oneself in a legal proceeding."  Florida Bar v. Ratiner, __ So.3d ___ (Fla., No. SC08-689, 6/24/2010), 2010 WL 2517995.

Florida Supreme Court disciplines lawyer who allowed non-lawyer to have signatory authority on escrow account.  [Added 6/10/10]

    Lawyer agreed to handle real estate closings for Lending Group.  She opened an escrow account for these closings.  Lawyer allowed the nonlawyer principal of Lending Group ["Principal"] to have signatory authority on the escrow account.  "However, because she recognized the inherent danger of allowing a nonlawyer access to an escrow account maintained in her name as an escrow agent and Florida lawyer, she placed caps on the amounts of money that [Principal] could access or control in the escrow account."

    For one closing that occurred in Orlando on short (same-day) notice, Lawyer express mailed 10 blank, signed account checks to a nonlawyer title processor for Lending Group.  Lawyer "did not attend the closing and did not see, review, or approve the closing documents before the closing."  Checks from the escrow account were issued.  Principal ordered a stop payment on a check issued to the sellers in the transaction and misappropriated all of the funds involved, about $128,000.  When Lawyer learned of the misappropriation, she notified law enforcement authorities and worked to ensure that the sellers were made whole.

    The Florida Bar charged Lawyer with violating various Rules of Professional Conduct, including 4-1.1 (lawyer must provide competent representation), 4-1.15 (lawyer must comply with trust accounting rules), 4-5.3(a) (paralegals must work under lawyer's direction or supervision), 4-5.3(b) (lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that nonlawyers retained by or associated with lawyer act in manner compatible with lawyer's ethical obligations), 4-5.3(c) (lawyer must review and be responsible for work product of paralegals), 4-8.4(a) (lawyer shall not violate ethics rules or do so through others), and 4-8.4(d) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice).  The referee who tried the disciplinary case recommended that Lawyer be found not guilty of all charges.  The Bar sought Supreme Court review of the referee's conclusions regarding Rules 4-1.1, 4-5.3(b), 4-5.3(c), 4-8.4(a), and 4-8.4(d).

    The Supreme Court concluded that "although [Lawyer's] conduct in this case reflected poor judgment in several respects," she did not violate Rules 4-1.1, 4-5.3(c), 4-8.4(a), or 4-8.4(d).  The Court, however, did find that Lawyer did violate Rule 4-5.3(b) (lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that nonlawyers retained by or associated with lawyer act in manner compatible with lawyer's ethical obligations).  The Court concluded:  "[Lawyer's] professional obligations as a lawyer included holding and delivering possession of the escrowed funds in strict accordance with the principals’ agreement and supervising the closing in a reasonably prudent manner.  By allowing [Principal], a nonlawyer whom she neither employed, supervised, nor controlled, essentially unfettered access to the funds held in the escrow account, [Lawyer] failed in her responsibility to ensure that she had 'in effect measures giving reasonable assurance' that [Principal]’s conduct would be compatible with those professional obligations.  In fact, when it comes to the area of funds held in trust by a lawyer, we conclude that a reading of rule 4-5.3 in its entirety leads to only one reasonable conclusion.  A lawyer may permit a nonlawyer to have authority or control over such funds only if that nonlawyer is employed by or under the direct supervision and control of the lawyer."  (Emphasis by Court.)

    The Court distinguished Florida Ethics Opinions 64-40 and 64-40 (Reconsideration), which concerned trusted nonlawyer employees of a lawyer having signatory authority on the lawyer's trust account.  "We do not read these opinions as authorizing a lawyer to permit a nonlawyer, nonemployee to have essentially unfettered access to funds held in trust by the attorney, whether in an IOTA trust account or an escrow account in the attorney’s name.  There is a critical distinction between an attorney’s office manager and a person who is neither employed by, responsible to, nor otherwise under the supervision and control of the lawyer as here."

    The Court remanded for a hearing on the appropriate sanction, "including consideration of a rehabilitative suspension."  Florida Bar v. Hines, __ So.3d ___, 35 Fla.L.Weekly S337 (Fla., No. SC08-2297, 6/10/2010), 2010 WL 2301711.

In conflict of interest case, Florida Supreme Court imposes harsher disciplinary sanction than that recommended by referee.  [Added 6/10/10]

    Lawyer represented a client in connection with a federal regulatory matter in which orders were entered prohibiting the client from engaging in certain activities.  Three years later, the client secured a potential investor in a new venture.  The potential investor was unaware of the client's prior regulatory background or criminal history.  When asked by the potential investor about the client, Lawyer "made statements to the effect that [the client] was 'an honest man.'"  Lawyer represented the client in the business negotiations with the potential investor.

    Eventually the two individuals went into business, with Lawyer now representing the business entity.  Things began to unravel and various legal actions ensued.  At various times Lawyer represented the client, the investor, the business entity, and other investors who had potential claims adverse to the business or the principals.  Lawyer was disqualified from several of the suits because he was representing or had represented clients whose interests were in conflict.

    The Bar brought disciplinary charges against Lawyer.  The referee found him guilty of multiple rule violations, including Rule 4-1.7 (the current client conflict of interest rule) and Rule 4-1.9 (the former client conflict rule).  The referee recommended an 18-month suspension.  Both Lawyer and the Bar requested Supreme Court review.

    The Court agreed that Lawyer was guilty of the rules violations, but disagreed with the recommended sanction.  The Court suspended Lawyer for 3 years, commenting that under the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions Lawyer's conduct "comes close to that dividing line" between suspension and disbarment.  In determining the term of suspension, the Court referred to Florida Bar v. Feige, 596 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1992).

    The Court briefly addressed one unique argument presented by Lawyer.  He contended that his "duty to protect the public took precedence over his duty to maintain client confidentiality or to decline the representation of a client where a conflict of interest exists or is likely to arise."  The Court gave no credence to this contention, stating:  "We reject [Lawyer]'s argument that it was permissible for him to represent the [entity's] investors despite the conflicts presented by his representation under some kind of duty-to-the-public exception.  No such exception exists."  Lawyer should have referred them to conflict-free counsel.  Florida Bar v. Scott, __ So.3d ___, 35 Fla.L.Weekly S333 (Fla., No. SC05-1145, 6/10/2010), 2010 WL 2301701.

Florida Supreme Court disciplines lawyer for using firm name containing term "expert."  [Added 5/21/10]

    The Florida Supreme Court issued an order in a disciplinary case enjoining Lawyer from using the term "Expert" or "Experts" in any ad or trade name, and placing him on probation for one year (with conditions that he attend the Bar's Advertising Workshop and have the Bar pre-approve his ads).

    Justice Pariente wrote a concurring opinion in which 2 other justices joined, explaining that Lawyer was disciplined "because he used the trade name 'Legal Experts,' when he was a sole practitioner who was not certified by The Florida Bar in all fields of specialization.  The use of this trade name is misleading to the public."  The concurring opinion further noted that Lawyer "had been using this trade name since April 2006, prior to our approval of the Bar's request to allow lawyers who are board-certified by The Florida Bar to identify themselves as 'experts'."

    Justice Lewis vigorously dissented, continuing to express his dissatisfaction with the Court's approval of the rule change that permitted board-certified lawyers to describe themselves as "experts."  (See In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 978 So.2d 91 (Fla. 2007) (Lewis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar – Advertising, 971 So.2d 763 (Fla. 2007) (Lewis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).)  His dissenting opinion stated in part:  "[A]n individual in accordance with the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar and this Court's approval was allowed to hold himself out under the very inappropriate label of 'expert,' but is being disciplined under these disjointed advertising rules for engaging in practices which The Florida Bar urged this Court to allow.  I do not dissent because I approve of the actions taken by [Lawyer] – in fact, I fully disapprove of the concept of The Florida Bar designating 'experts.'  However, the fundamental and primary problem rests in this Court‘s approval of the use of the term 'expert' in the first place.  This Court should have never allowed attorneys to exploit inexperienced clients by adopting the unverifiable, qualitatively based designation of 'expert.'  This nonsensical advertising farce is demonstrated by a situation recently before this Court.  We first allowed a lawyer to be identified as an 'expert' in appellate law only to discover that he was not qualified to handle capital cases before this Court.  This resulted in the Court reporting the deficiencies and actually precluding him from handling capital cases here.  See Admin. Order No. AOSC10-6 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Feb. 19, 2010)."  Florida Bar v. Doane, __ So.3d ___, 35 Fla.L.Weekly S278 (Fla., No. SC08-1278, 5/20/2010), 2010 WL 1997127.

Florida Supreme rejects referee's recommended sanction and disbars suspended lawyer found guilty of contempt.  [Added 3/2/10]

    While suspended from the practice of law, Lawyer used her Florida Bar card to get access to a friend who was incarcerated.  Lawyer unsuccessfully attempted to get the friend to sign a lease giving her an interest in an auto.  Lawyer then went to a towing business, again used her Florida Bar card to represent herself as the friend's counsel, and had the auto released to herself.  The friend later had to file a replevin action to get her auto back.

    The Florida Bar filed a petition to hold Lawyer in contempt.  The referee found that Lawyer's actions constituted contemptuous conduct by a suspended attorney.  The referee recommended a 30-day suspension and a 3-year probation upon reinstatement.  The Bar petitioned for Supreme Court review.

    The Court disbarred Lawyer.  Lawyer's actions, her disciplinary history, and case law were cited in support of the Court's decision.  "[Lawyer]'s disregard for the Court’s authority, based upon her belief that she was justified in her actions, casts doubt upon her fitness to practice law within the confines of ethical standards.  Such misconduct also adds to the public’s negative perception of lawyers, thus causing injury to the legal profession.  Moreover, by using her Florida Bar identification card to misrepresent her status as an attorney, both to enter the jail and obtain immediate and private access to a  prisoner and to obtain the prisoner’s vehicle from the impound lot, [Lawyer] acted deceitfully and engaged in misrepresentation.  Consequently, jail officials sustained injury, where their policy prohibiting members of the public from immediate and private access with prisoners, presumably for purposes of security, was eluded.  Finally, the owner of the vehicle had to take legal action to ultimately recover the vehicle from [Lawyer]."  Florida Bar v. Bitterman, 33 So.3d 686 (Fla. 2010).

Florida Supreme Court rejects stipulation for reinstatement of suspended lawyer due to her failure to pay restitution and costs.  [Added 2/19/10]

    Lawyer, who had been suspended from the practice of law, and the Florida Bar stipulated to Lawyer's reinstatement.  Apparently the referee approved the stipulation.  On review, however, in an order the Florida Supreme Court disapproved the referee's report and rejected the stipulation.

    Two justices dissented to the Court's decision.  Lawyer apparently had not paid the restitution ordered at the time of her suspension ($1600 to one client and $800 to another), nor paid the costs of more than $4600.  According to the Bar, Lawyer had not paid "due to financial constraints."  Justice Pariente, in her dissent joined by Justice Perry, stated:  "Neither the Bar nor the referee found any evidence of bad faith.  The Bar, after determining the respondent’s financial inability to pay, reimbursed the clients and thus the respondent now owes The Florida Bar Client Security Fund.  The Bar agreed to a payment plan, approved by the Board of Governors and the referee, and the repayment would be a condition of her probation.  I would thus grant the petition for reinstatement and require compliance with the payment plan to be a condition of probation.  If the Court is going to require either full repayment or at least a certain amount to be repaid, even where there are no financial means, we should set forth those requirements in a clearly enunciated rule rather than on an ad hoc basis without prior notice or explanation."  Florida Bar re: Thompson (Fla., No. SC09-263, 2/18/1020).

Florida Supreme Court rejects referee's recommendation of lesser sanction and suspends lawyer for 1 year for violations relating to candor and conflict of interest.  [Added 1/9/10]

    Lawyer represented Clients in a mortgage foreclosure dispute that led to Clients filing bankruptcy.  Clients owed the lender money, and also ended up owing Lawyer money for legal work.  Clients obtained financing to pay off the mortgage.  At the closing on the refinancing, Lawyer sought a payment of $10,000 for his outstanding fees.  The primary reason for the refinancing was to pay off the mortgage creditor, but the $10,000 payment to Lawyer from the loan proceeds "prevented the achievement of this goal."  Lawyer filed two different HUD statements regarding the transaction.

    Additionally, Lawyer made filings that the bankruptcy court later found "disingenuous," and that court also found that Lawyer's conducted created a conflict with his clients and violated provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  Lawyer filed a "Suggestion of Bankruptcy" for his law firm, but never petitioned for bankruptcy.

    The Florida Bar charged Lawyer with violations of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.  The referee assigned to try the case found Lawyer guilty of violating Rule 4-3.3 (falsely representing to court that law firm filed for bankruptcy protection), Rule 4-1.7 (conflict of interest with Clients by accepting $10,000 payment that kept Clients from paying off creditor), Rule 4-3.1 (filing frivolous pleading by filing false suggestion of bankruptcy), Rule 4-4.1 (false statements to bankruptcy trustee by filing suggestion of bankruptcy), Rule 4-8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and Rule 4-8.4(d) (engaging in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  The referee recommended that Lawyer be suspended from practice for 60 days.

    On review requested by the Bar, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the recommended discipline and instead suspended Lawyer for 1 year and thereafter until he proves rehabilitation.

    "[Lawyer] argues that his misconduct was 'minor.'  Contrary to his perspective, the Court does not view violations of rule 4-8.4(c) . . . and rule 4-8.4(d) . . . as minor.  The Court has clearly stated that 'basic, fundamental dishonesty . . . is a serious flaw, which cannot be tolerated' because dishonesty and a lack of candor 'cannot be tolerated by a profession that relies on the truthfulness of its members.'  Fla. Bar v. Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 2002).  Dishonest conduct demonstrates the utmost disrespect for the court and is destructive to the legal system as a whole."

    The Court also rejected Lawyer's contention that he lacked intent to engage in misconduct.  "[I]t is well established in disciplinary case law that 'in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing.'"  (Citations omitted.)

    The Court also confirmed the finding of a conflict of interest.  "[Lawyer] knew his clients were unable to pay his fee unless they used money from the refinancing loan.  In accepting the $10,000 from the refinancing, he knew his clients would be unable to pay off their primary creditor, Turner.  Paying Turner in full had been the main objective for the refinancing loan.  Thus, [Lawyer]’s action created a conflict of interest that proved detrimental to his clients.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client when the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment may be materially limited by the lawyer’s own interests)."  Florida Bar v. Head, 27 So.3d 1 (Fla. 2010).

Florida Supreme Court disbars lawyer for two instances of engaging in unlicensed practice of law.  [Added 11/18/09]  --  Florida Bar v. D'Ambrosio, 25 So.3d 1209 (Fla. 2009).

Florida Supreme Court sanctions disbarred lawyer who submitted numerous filings seeking readmission.  [Added 9/2/09]  --  Florida Board of Bar Examiners re: Anthony Eladio Ramos, 17 So.3d 268 (Fla. 2009).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment for law firm sued on fee-sharing agreement by disciplined attorney.  [Added 8/11/09]  --  Chastain v. Cunningham Law Group, P.A., 16 So.3d 203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Florida Supreme Court refuses reinstatement for a lawyer who engaged in the "practice of law" while suspended; definition discussed.  [Added 7/13/09]  --  Florida Bar re: Michael Howard Wolf, 21 So.3d 15 (Fla. 2009).

Florida Supreme Court again imposes harsher disciplinary sanctions than recommended by referee, and refuses to recognize personal financial loss and embarrassment in mitigation.  [Added 5/26/09]  --  Florida Bar v. Ticktin, 14 So.3d 928 (Fla. 2009).

Florida Supreme Court disbars lawyer for sexual misconduct, falsifying evidence, and trust account violations.  [Added 5/1/09]  --  Florida Bar v. Tipler, 8 So.3d 1109 (Fla. 2009).

Florida Supreme Court imposes 18-month suspension on lawyer who started business that competed with one of his clients.  [Added 2/24/09]  --  Florida Bar v. Herman, 8 So.3d 1100 (Fla. 2009).

Supreme Court advises Governor that suspended lawyer who was elected to circuit judgeship is not eligible to take judicial office.  [Added 2/4/09]  --  Advisory Opinion to the Governor re: Commission of Elected Judge, 17 So.3d 265 (Fla. 2009).

Rejecting lesser sanction, Supreme Court suspends lawyer (who was just elected to the circuit bench) for disrespectful conduct toward a presiding judge.  [Added 1/10/09]  --  Florida Bar v. Abramson, 3 So.2d 964 (Fla. 2009).

Florida Supreme Court again imposes harsher disciplinary sanction than that recommended by referee and sought by Bar.  [Added 10/21/08]  --  Florida Bar v. De la Torre, 994 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 2008).

Florida Supreme Court again imposes harsher disciplinary sanctions than those recommended by referee and sought by Bar.  [Added 9/26/08]  --  Florida Bar v. Varner, 992 So.2d 224 (Fla. 2008).

Florida Supreme Court disbars rather than suspends lawyer for having what "was in essence a partnership" with nonlawyer for immigration practice.  [Added 6/30/08]  --  Florida Bar v. Glueck, 985 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 2008).

In "disciplinary case of first impression," Florida Supreme Court rejects recommended discipline and suspends lawyer for misconduct related to adoption.  [Added 6/14/2008]  --  Florida Bar v. Dove, 985 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 2008).

Lawyer who is subject of disciplinary proceedings barred from further pro se filings in case by Florida Supreme Court.  [Added 3/21/08]  --  Florida Bar v. Thompson, 979 So.2d 917 (Fla. 2008).  NOTE:  The Supreme Court subsequently permanently disbarred the lawyer.  Florida Bar v. Thompson, 994 So.2d 306 (Table).

Finding additional conflict of interest violation, Florida Supreme Court rejects recommended discipline and suspends lawyer.  [Added 1/24/08]  --  Florida Bar v. Brown, 978 So.2d 107 (Fla. 2008).

Florida Supreme Court rejects referee's findings of mitigating factors and imposes disbarment rather than recommended suspension.  [Added 1/14/08]  --  Florida Bar v. Valentine-Miller, 974 So.2d 333 (Fla. 2008).

In disciplinary case, Florida Supreme Court approves referee's rejection of drug addiction as "physical or mental disability" mitigating factor.  [Added 12/15/07]  --  The Florida Bar v. Bloom, 972So.2d 172 (Fla. 2007).

Florida Bar prosecutors absolutely immune from civil liability for actions taken in connection with their official duties, even if actions taken intentionally and maliciously.  [Added 11/24/07]  --  Spano v. Hoffman, 968 So.2d 674 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Lawyer suspended for 91 days for failing to disclose to opposing counsel settlement agreement procured by lawyer's client and purportedly signed by opposing counsel's client.  [Added 7/13/07]  --  Florida Bar v. Nicnick, 963 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2007).

For first time, Florida Supreme Court readmits on conditional basis lawyer who resigned for disciplinary reasons.  [Added 6/17/07]  --  Florida Board of Bar Examiners re: Mark Stephen Barnett, 959 So.2d 234 (Fla. 2007).

"As a matter of policy" Florida Supreme Court orders respondent lawyer to pay Bar's costs of seeking review of referee's recommended discipline, even though respondent did not seek review.  [Added 6/15/07]  --  Florida Bar v. Martinez-Genova, 959 So.2d 241 (Fla. 2007) (opinion on rehearing).

Florida Supreme Court rejects referee's recommendation and imposes reprimand rather than diversion in case involving lawyer's "sharp practice."  [Added 6/9/07]  --  Florida Bar v. Cocalis, 959 So.2d 163 (Fla. 2007).

Florida Supreme Court discusses use of "failure to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct" as aggravating factor in disciplinary cases.  [Added 5/21/07]  --  Florida Bar v. Germain, 957 So.2d 613 (Fla. 2007).

Florida Supreme Court holds that Rule 4-5.6(b) is constitutional, and imposes fee forfeiture and stiff discipline on 2 lawyers who entered undisclosed engagement agreement with clients' adversary.  [Added 5/8/07]  --  Florida Bar v. Rodriguez, 959 So.2d 150 (Fla. 2007); Florida Bar v. St. Louis, 967 So.2d 108 (Fla. 2007).

Rejecting referee's recommendation, Florida Supreme Court suspends rather than disbars lawyer convicted of felonies.  [Added 4/25/07]  --  Florida Bar v. Del Pino, 955 So.2d 556 (Fla. 2007).

Supreme Court suspends lawyer for 90 days, rather than 2 years as recommended by referee, for violating competence and conflict rules.  [Added 4/17/07]  --  Florida Bar v. Maurice, 955 So.2d 535 (Fla. 2007).

Florida Supreme Court disbars lawyer charged with misappropriating client funds, despite mental health mitigation and referee's recommendation of 3-year suspension.  [Added 4/4/07]  --  Florida Bar v. Brownstein, 953 So.2d 502 (Fla. 2007).

Florida Supreme Court disbars lawyer who practiced while suspended.  [Added 2/26/07]  --  The Florida Bar v. Walkden, 950 So.2d 407 (Fla. 2007).

Florida Supreme Court refuses to order lawyer to pay restitution to third party in disciplinary case.  [Added 12/15/06]  --  Florida Bar v. Walton, 952 So.2d 510 (Fla. 2006).

Lawyer's trial conduct leading to trial court's imposition of sanctions results in 91-day suspension by Supreme Court (rather than 10-day recommended suspension).  [Added 11/2/06]  --  The Florida Bar v. Tobkin, 944 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2006).

Lawyer who failed to properly supervise employee had requisite "intent" and was found guilty of violating Rule 4-8.4(c) and suspended for 3 years.  [Added 10/6/06]  --  The Florida Bar v. Riggs, 944 So.2d 167 (Fla. 2006).

Lawyer's "mere attendance at a courtroom proceeding," without more, not sufficient to support conclusion that lawyer practiced law while suspended.  [Added 10/23/06]  --  The Florida Bar v. D'Ambrosio, 944 So.2d 977 (Fla. 2006).

Suspended lawyer who failed to provide evidence of alcohol and drug rehabilitation denied reinstatement.  [Added 10/20/06]  --  The Florida Bar re: Alan R. Hochman, 944 So.2d 198 (Fla. 2006).

Fourth DCA upholds perjury conviction of lawyer's former employee who filed bar grievance containing untrue statement.  [Added 10/18/06]  --  Rutherford v. State, 939 So.2d 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Fee refunds may be ordered only under limited circumstances in disciplinary cases, per Florida Supreme Court.  [Added 6/29/06]  --  The Florida Bar v. Feige, 937 So.2d 605 (Fla. 2006).

Lawyer suspended for 91 days for "inappropriate courtroom behavior."  [Added 6/26/06]  --  The Florida Bar v. Morgan, 938 So.2d 496 (Fla 2006).

Florida Supreme Court warns that it is moving toward stronger sanctions for lawyer misconduct.  [Added 6/8/06]  --  The Florida Bar v. Broome, 932 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 2006).

Bar's unexplained delay in prosecuting disciplinary case is factor in Court's decision to impose 2-year, rather than 3-year, suspension.  [Added 2/24/06]  --  The Florida Bar v. Wolf, 930 So.2d 574 (Fla. 2006).

Florida denies reinstatement to suspended lawyer who has not been readmitted to bar of his home state.  [Added 2/20/06]  --  The Florida Bar re: Untracht, 923 So.2d 457 (Fla. 2006).

"Managing attorney" for nonlawyer's immigration business suspended for one year for assisting UPL and fee-splitting with nonlawyer.  [Added 1/18/06]  --  The Florida Bar v. Abrams, 919 So.2d 425 (Fla. 2006).

90-day suspension for lawyer who acted as counsel of record for disbarred lawyer and thus allowed him to provide legal services for his clients and commit UPL.  [Added 11/28/05]  --  The Florida Bar v. Stein, 916 So.2d 774 (Fla. 2005).

Lawyer who practiced law while suspended sanctioned; no willful contempt due to mental health mitigation.  [Added 10/18/05]  --  The Florida Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So.2d 554 (Fla. 2005).

Florida Bar grievance committee meetings confidential; respondents may be barred from attending.  [Added 10/18/05]  --  The Florida Bar v. Committe, 916 So.2d 741 (Fla. 2005).

Florida Supreme Court declines to revoke lawyer's board certification as disciplinary sanction.  [Added 9/21/05]  --  The Florida Bar v. Kavanaugh, 915 So.2d 89 (Fla. 2005).

Misconduct dealing with his law firm nets lawyer 90-day suspension.  [Added 7/12/05]  --  The Florida Bar v. Shankman, 908 So.2d 379 (Fla. 2005).

Lawyer's moonlighting and subsequent denial results in loss of job and 30 day suspension from practice.  [Added 6/2/05]  --  The Florida Bar v. Kossow, 912 So.2d 544 (Fla. 2005).

ADA does not preclude Supreme Court from disbarring lawyer with serious drug and alcohol addiction.  [Added 3/3/05]  --  The Florida Bar v. Gross, 896 So.2d 742 (Fla. 2005).

Lawyer's cessation of conduct that resulted in emergency suspension not valid basis for lifting suspension.  [Added 2/4/05]  --  The Florida Bar v. Guerra, 896 So.2d 705 (Fla. 2005).

3-year suspension, not disbarment, appropriate for cases of client neglect short of "abandonment."  [Added 8/23/04]  --  The Florida Bar v. Shoureas, 892 So.2d 1002 (Fla. 2004).

Supreme Court rules that writing single $100 worthless check does not violate disciplinary rules, and declines to order restitution absent improper fees or misappropriation.  [Added 1/22/04]  --  The Florida Bar v. Smith, 866 So.2d 41 (Fla. 2004).