sunEthics

FLORIDA NEWS ARCHIVE - JUDICIAL ETHICS, Disqualification

Judge is disqualified for stating reasons for denying legally insufficient motion seeking her disqualification  [Added 8/13/08]

    A party moved to disqualify a trial judge.  Judge denied the motion as legally insufficient.  The movant petitioned the Third DCA for a writ of prohibition seeking to remove Judge.

    The appellate court granted the petition.  Although agreeing that the motion was legally insufficient, the court pointed out that "after ruling on the petitioners’ motion to disqualify, the trial judge addressed the merits of the motion and stated her reasons for the ruling.  Accordingly, prohibition disqualifying the trial judge is required.  See Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.330(f) (stating that after deeming the motion to disqualify insufficient, '[n]o other reason for denial shall be stated) . . ."  Stelzer v. Chin, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla. 3d DCA, No. 3D08-1776, 8/6/2008).

Florida Supreme Court amends Florida Rules of Judicial Administration concerning judicial disqualification motions  [Added 7/15/08]

    Responding to a proposal from the Florida Bar Rules of Judicial Administration Committee, the Florida Supreme Court has amended the Rules.  One of the amendments is to Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.330(c) ("Disqualification of Trial Judges; Motion").  The Court's opinion stated that this amendment "adds the requirement that a motion to disqualify a trial judge 'include the dates of all previously granted motions to disqualify filed under this rule in the case and the dates of the orders granting those motions.'  Putting a successor judge on notice that a prior judge has been disqualified will help to ensure the proper standard is applied to successive motions.  See Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.330(g) (providing that if a judge has been previously disqualified, the successor judge may rule on the truth or the facts alleged in support of a successive motion by the same party and shall not be disqualified unless the successor judge rules that he or she is in fact not fair or impartial in the case)."  In re: Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla., No. SC08-135, 7/10/2008), 2008 WL 2679171.

Trial judge's remarks about hearing arguments "ad nauseum" were not legally sufficient to justify judge's disqualification  [Added 6/6/08]

    During litigation involving 2 cases, the trial judge made remarks about hearing the parties' arguments "ad nauseum" and how a "proctologist couldn't have been more thorough than what we did."  One party moved to disqualify the judge based on his remarks.  Before the judge could rule on the motion, and before the time limit for ruling expired, Movant petitioned the Fourth DCA for a writ of certiorari.  After the certiorari petitions were filed the trial judge denied the disqualification motion as legally sufficient.  Movant, however, argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction when the certiorari petitions were filed.

    The Fourth DCA rejected Movant's jurisdictional argument.  "The filing of a petition for writ of prohibition in this posture does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on the motion to disqualify."

    The appellate court also concluded that the motion to disqualify was legally insufficient.  "The judge in this case, having repeatedly heard the arguments of both parties 'ad nauseum' was permitted to enter a ruling on the issues.  A judge must be permitted to serve in his or her role as decision maker.  A judge must not be unduly biased against a party or prejudge a matter but, after hearing the evidence and arguments, a judge must be permitted to 'judge.'  While the judge’s choice of terminology, 'ad nauseum,' and '[a] proctologist couldn’t have been more thorough than what we did,' in describing the amount of argument that was heard on the issues, may have been blunt in this case, this did not establish an objectively reasonable basis for petitioner to fear the judge was prejudiced or biased against him.  The judge heard extensive argument on the issues and both parties were permitted more than adequate time to argue their side."

    Finally, the appellate court questioned the conduct of Movant's lawyer.  "The petitions contain many exaggerated arguments that are not supported by the record.  We reject these unsupported contentions and caution petitioner’s counsel that the filing of frivolous actions, or those initiated in 'bad faith,' can result in sanctions.  Fla.R.App.P. 9.410."  Letterese v. Brody, 985 So.2d 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Hearing officer should be disqualified because of her participation in action that led to proceeding over which she presided  [Added 5/17/08]  -- 

    Petitioner was a faculty member at Community College.  The college's Board of Trustees voted to terminate his employment.  Petitioner filed an administrative appeal.  The person appointed as hearing officer appointed to preside over the appeal was a member of the College's Board of Trustees who had voted in favor of Petitioner's termination.  Petitioner moved to disqualify Hearing Officer.  Hearing Officer denied the motion.  Petitioner then petitioned the Third DCA for a writ of prohibition.

The Third DCA granted the writ, despite the fact that under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act the College had the option of designating a member of the agency head (here, the Board of Trustees) to be the hearing officer.  "The fact that the Community College has the authority to appoint a trustee to be the hearing officer does not immunize the hearing officer from a disqualification challenge."  A litigant in an administrative proceeding has the right to an impartial hearing officer.  "In this case [Hearing Officer], a member of the Board of Trustees, voted to terminate [Petitioner's] employment.  She has now been designated to be the hearing officer to conduct an administrative trial of [Petitioner's] case.  The circumstances would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he will not obtain a fair and impartial hearing.  The legal standard was met."  Hearing Officer was disqualified.  Jones v. Florida Keys Community College, 984 So.2d 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Judge not disqualified for his remarks in connection with petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel him to set case for trial and response filed by judge after he denied motion to disqualify him  [Added 4/14/08]

    Plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to require the trial judge to set the case for trial.  At the hearing on the motion the judge made remarks that resulted in Plaintiffs' filing a motion to disqualify the judge.  The judge denied the motion to disqualify.  Plaintiffs then filed a petition for writ of prohibition seeking to remove the judge from the case.  The judge filed a pro se response to the petition.  The Third DCA ruled that the judge should not be disqualified for either his remarks or the pro se response he filed.

    Regarding the judge's remarks, the appellate court stated:  "The remarks of the trial court judge in the present case fail to demonstrate personal bias or prejudice and cannot be interpreted as creating in the petitioners an objectively reasonable well-grounded fear that the petitioners will not receive a fair and impartial trial."

    Regarding the judge's pro se response to the petition for writ of prohibition, the court stated:  "The trial judge’s pro se response filed in this Court is not grounds for disqualification.  The trial judge does not attempt to dispute the basis of the charges of disqualification, try to explain his actions or pass on the truth as stated, any of which could be grounds for disqualification.  Scholz v. Hauser, 657 So.2d 950, 951 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).  All the trial court judge attempts to do in the pro se  response is explain the record and what had transpired in this action.  Kowalski v. Boyles, 557 So.2d 885, 887 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding that in ruling on the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify, the judge may explain the status of the record)."

    One judge dissented, quoting the trial judge's response and asserting that the response "went beyond stating why the Petition for Writ of Prohibition was legally insufficient.  It explained his conduct, the back-up system and the motives of the petitioners."  Rolle v. Birken, 984 So.2d 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee addresses questions raised when judge's adult child seeks employment at law firm with cases that will come before judge  [Added 3/27/08]

    Judge is assigned to the civil division.  Judge's adult child is interviewing for attorney positions at local law firms that handle cases of the type over which Judge presides.  Judge asked the Florida Supreme Court's Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee for an opinion regarding several issues relating to this situation.

"Issue I.  Whether the Inquiring Judge’s adult child who is a lawyer would be prohibited from accepting employment with a firm representing clients in matters before the Judge’s division."  The committee answered in the negative.

    Canon 3D(1)(d) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in proceedings in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  This includes situations where someone related to the judge within the third degree of relationship (which includes the judge's children) acts as a lawyer in the proceeding or "is known by the judge to have more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding."  Although this canon does not automatically require the judge's disqualification in every proceeding in which a judge's relative is employed at a law firm involved in the proceeding, "the Committee has consistently reached the conclusion that when a judge’s child is employed as a lawyer at a law firm appearing before the judge, the judge’s child has more than a de minimis economic interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding [footnotes omitted]."

"Issue II.  Whether disclosure on the record at the earliest possible time of the Judge’s adult child’s employment as a lawyer with the firm, coupled with a representation that the Judge’s child does not and will not have any role in the case, and will be 'walled off' from the case internally within the firm, is sufficient to avoid disqualification."  The committee answered in the negative.

    The committee was of the view that Judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned even if the child was "walled off."  The committee further noted that, even if he or she was "walled off," as a member of the law firm Judge's child "would still have a more than de minimis economic interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding."  Consequently, the committee concluded that Judge "must disqualify himself or herself from all proceedings in which the law firm employing the Judge’s child is involved, unless all parties agree to remittal of disqualification pursuant to Canon 3F."

"Issue III.  Whether the Inquiring Judge may appoint a special master or receiver from a firm where the Judge’s adult child is employed as an associate attorney."  The committee answered in the negative. 

    The committee applied the same analysis as in Issue II, regardless of whether the member of the law firm was appointed before Judge’s child joined the firm or after that occurred.  "Because the law firm would be receiving compensation for services as a special master or receiver, and judicial decisions could impact such matters as the length of service or the scope of services, as a lawyer in the firm the Judge’s child has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding."  Accordingly, "Judge would need to disqualify himself or herself from any proceeding in which the Judge’s child’s new law firm is already acting as a special master or receiver, unless the parties agree to remittal pursuant to Canon 3F."

    Appointments after Judge's child joined the law firm would implicate Canon 3C(4), which states that a judge "shall exercise the power of appointment impartially and on the basis of merit.  A judge shall avoid nepotism and favoritism."  Although such an appointment would not appear to violate Florida's anti-nepotism law (Fla.Stat. sec. 112.3135), "even if the appointment is made on the merits, the Committee believes the propriety of the appointment could reasonably be questioned because of the appearance of favoritism and is therefore prohibited by Canon 2."  As a result, the committee concluded that "it would be inappropriate for the Judge to make a new appointment of a special master or receiver from the law firm employing the Judge’s child in any proceeding pending before the Judge.  Further, the Committee is of the opinion that the appointment of a member of the Judge’s child’s law firm could not be the subject of remittal by the parties."  Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 2008-06 (March 17, 2008).

Timeliness of motion to disqualify judge is measured from when movant "actually discovered" information prompting motion, per Florida Supreme Court  [Added 2/21/08]

    A convicted Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, asserting various claims.  The motion was denied.  Defendant appealed to the Florida Supreme Court.  Among the claims addressed by the Court was Defendant's contention that the postconviction judge had erred in denying his motion for the judge's disqualification.  The judge had denied the motion as both untimely and legally insufficient.  The Supreme Court concluded that the motion had been timely filed, but also concluded that the motion was properly denied.

Timeliness of the motion to disqualify.  Defendant's counsel filed his Notice of Appearance on March 18, 2003.  Nine days later counsel filed a motion to disqualify the judge on the ground that the judge, after the sentencing in Defendant's case, had testified on behalf of one of Defendant's victims at the victim's sentencing hearing.  Defendant's counsel discovered this information "soon after" he filed his notice of appearance.  Counsel apparently learned the information from a 2000 newspaper article. 

    In responding to Defendant's timeliness argument on appeal, "[t]he State speculates as to various reasons that [Defendant's] counsel could have, or should have, acquired this information prior to the entering of the notice of appearance in the postconviction proceedings."  The Supreme Court rejected the State's argument, pointing out that Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160 (since renumbered as Rule 2.330(e)) "establishes timeliness based on when the information was actually discovered."  (Emphasis in original.)  The rule provides:  "A motion to disqualify shall be filed within a reasonable time not to exceed 10 days after discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion and shall be promptly presented to the court for an immediate ruling.  Any motion for disqualification made during a hearing or trial must be based on facts discovered during the hearing or trial and may be stated on the record, provided that it is also promptly reduced to writing in compliance with subdivision (c) and promptly filed.  A motion made during hearing or trial shall be ruled on immediately."

Sufficiency of the motion to disqualify.  The Court concluded that the motion was legally insufficient as it "fail[ed] to establish a well-grounded fear on the part of [Defendant] that he would not receive a fair hearing."  The Court cited Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1192 (Fla. 2001), and Rivera v. State, 717 So.2d 477, 480-81 (Fla. 1988), as support for its decision.  "Moreover, our decision is additionally guided by the fact that every judge who is vested with the responsibility to preside over postconviction proceedings of a capital defendant after he or she has presided over the original trial will have issued a detailed sentencing order that, under Florida law, requires that details of the facts of the crimes committed by the defendant be set forth and weighed by both the judge and jury."  Doorbal v. State, 983 So.2d 464 (Fla. 2008).

Judge's recusal in one case due to difficult relationship with assistant state attorney does not preclude judge from presiding over cases involving other lawyers from same office  [Added 2/21/08]

    During Judge's assignment in the criminal division he had a difficult relationship with a particular assistant state attorney.  Judge is now assigned to the civil division.  Recently the spouse of that assistant state attorney became a litigant in a case assigned to Judge.  The spouse filed a "Motion to Recuse" Judge, alleging "that the relationship between the Judge and the assistant state attorney 'was tumultuous and resulted in numerous verbal confrontations and that there may be ill-will between the two'."  In response, Judge entered an "order of recusal."  Judge thereafter sent a letter to the State Attorney informing the State Attorney of the recusal, asking that the assistant state attorney not be assigned to appear before Judge (in his capacity as duty judge), and informing the State Attorney that Judge intended to "inquire of the appropriate authorities to determine whether further separation between myself as judge and the State Attorney’s Office is required."

    Judge inquired of the Florida Supreme Court's Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee.  The Committee framed the issue before it a limited one:  "Do the recusal order and the letter, products of the judge’s relationship with one assistant state attorney, mandate a recusal or disqualification regarding all assistant state attorneys?"  The Committee answered in the negative, stating that "[n]either the recusal order, nor the letter suggests any bias against other assistant state attorneys or against the elected State Attorney."

    The Committee also cautioned Judge "to carefully review recusal or disqualification motions that might be legally insufficient.  While it is tempting to remove one’s self from a case to avoid a contentious judge/attorney relationship, unintended, collateral consequences can result from such orders."  The Committee noted that, while Canon 3E of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in proceedings in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, Canon 3B(1) "requires the judge to hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, except those in which disqualification is required."  [Emphasis in original.]  Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2008-04 (February 15, 2008).

Judge' recusal is required in cases where judge's former fiance is involved as forensic accounting expert  [Added 2/19/08]

    Judge will soon be assigned to the circuit court's family division.  Judge's former fiance often serves as a forensic accounting expert in family law cases.  The engagement ended more than two and a half years ago, and the two currently do not have a social relationship.  The former fiance's CPA firm presently leases office space from a partnership in which Judge is a partner.

    Judge asked the Florida Supreme Court's Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee for an advisory opinion concerning whether recusal is required in cases involving the former fiance and whether, in cases involving the CPA firm, Judge must disclose to parties that the firm leases office space from the partnership in which Judge is involved.

    First issue.  Canon 3E(1) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in situations in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  A majority of the Committee concluded that Judge's recusal was required.  The Committee stated:  "[T]he Judge’s engagement ended less than three years ago.  Given the short amount of time, prior JEAC opinions [Opinions 03-14, 95-15, and 93-17] and the commentary to Canon 3E, a majority of the Committee advises the Inquiring Judge that disqualification is necessary."  (Five members of the Committee, however, would have concluded that Judge need only disclose the prior relationship to the parties and their lawyers.)

    Second issue.  Regarding the second issue, the Committee concluded: "The commentary to Canon 3E(1) states that a judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification.  Accordingly, in addressing the second issue presented, the Committee unanimously agrees that the Judge should disclose the CPA firm’s business relationship with the Judge."  Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2008-03 (February 13, 2008).

Florida Supreme Court rules that circuit court's order on petition for writ of prohibition filed after motion to disqualify County court judge was denied is reviewable by certiorari rather than direct appeal  [Added 2/4/08]

    Petitioners were individuals charged with crimes who filed identical motions to disqualify a county court judge based on alleged bias toward Petitioners' lawyers.  The judge denied the disqualification motions.  Petitioners requested that the circuit court issue writs of prohibition to direct the county court judge to take no further action in their cases.  The circuit court denied the petitions for writs of prohibition.

    Rather than waiting until the conclusion of their cases, Petitioners attempted to seek immediate review of the circuit court's refusal to issue the writs of prohibition by filing notices of appeal in the First DCA.  The First DCA chose to treat the notices of appeal as petitions to invoke its certiorari jurisdiction.  Sutton v. State, (Fla. 1st DCA, No. 1D05-5922, 4/20/2008).  The Florida Supreme Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to resolve the conflict between Sutton and the decisions of other DCAs (Housing Authority of Tampa v. Burton, 873 So.2d 356 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Pinfield v. State, 710 So.2d 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Guzzetta v. Hamrick, 656 So.2d 1327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)).

    The Supreme Court approved Sutton, concluding that a circuit court's order on a petition for a writ of prohibition in this context is reviewable by certiorari.  Sutton v. State, 975 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 2008).

Judge's reputation for certain sentencing practices is not legally sufficient ground for judge's disqualification  [Added 1/14/08]

    A convicted criminal Defendant moved for vacation of his conviction and death sentence.  The circuit court denied the motion, and Defendant appealed to the Florida Supreme Court.  Among other things, Defendant alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to move for the trial judge's recusal, as Defendant had requested.  The Supreme Court affirmed.

    Defendant was afraid that the trial judge would override a potential jury recommendation of life imprisonment "because the trial judge had already imposed the death sentences in the cases of [Defendant's] three codefendants."  Defense counsel also indicated that "the trial judges in the circuit, and this trial judge in particular, were prone to order overrides."  Defense counsel, however, did not move for the judge's disqualification because he did not believe that there were sufficient grounds for doing so.

    The Supreme Court agreed that defense counsel acted properly in declining to move for disqualification.  "A trial judge’s action in other cases or a reputation among lawyers for certain sentencing practices are simply legally insufficient reasons to disqualify a trial judge.  Other cases may be distinguished on the facts or law, and 'reputation' for certain sentencing practices will no doubt exist for all judges, but it is simply insufficient to remove a judge from a case."  Williams v. State, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla., Nos. SC05-226, SC05-1579, 1/10/2008), 2008 WL 90003.

Judge disqualified from presiding over criminal trial due to "hostile remarks" directed at alleged victim's lawyer.  [Added 12/30/07]  --  State v. Alzate, 972 So.2d 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Judge not disqualified as result of campaign contribution made by judge's spouse to political opponent of criminal defendant's lawyer.  [Added 12/9/07]  --  Phillips v. State, 971 So.2d 149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee addresses when judge should make disclosure or be disqualified from cases involving lawyers on judge's campaign committee.  [Add 11/27/07]  --  Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-17.

Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee backs away from "bright line" rule on disqualification of judge in all cases where judge's relative is employed by a law firm.  [Added 10/17/07]  --  Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-16.

Judge disqualified from all cases involving law firm that employs judge's spouse as paralegal.  [Added 10/2/07]  --  Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-14.

Judge's comments on the merits of the case before pleadings were filed warranted judge's disqualification.  [Added 9/28/07]  --  NRD Investments, Inc. v. Velazquez, 965 So.2d 304 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Judge disqualified from presiding over Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 hearing where movant's trial counsel had hired judge's spouse as an expert witness multiple times.  [Added 8/31/07]  --  Aurigemma v. State, 964 So.2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Judge disqualified based on allegations that counsel for one party represented judge's "girlfriend" in unrelated case; no distinction between "girlfriend" and spouse for disqualification purposes.  [Added 8/9/07]  --  Baez v. Koelemij, 960 So.2d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007.)

Judges whose family members work for sheriff's department not disqualified from all cases involving sheriff's department.  [Added 7/20/07]  --  Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-11.

Motion to disqualify judge must be sworn to by moving party, not moving party's lawyer.  [Added 7/20/07]  --  Platman v. State, 961 So.2d 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

Judge's negative comments about juvenile during delinquency proceeding grounds for judge's disqualification.  [Added 7/18/07]  --  J.R. v. State, 959 So.2d 833 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

"Bright-line" rule requires that judicial disqualification motion be deemed granted because judge did not ensure it was ruled on within 30 days.  [Added 6/15/07]  --  Schisler v. State, 958 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Judge who leases office building to local legal aid agency is disqualified whenever lawyers from that agency appear before judge.  [Added 5/21/07]  --  Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-10.

Judge properly denied, as legally insufficient, motion to disqualify her on ground that she previously had "some prosecutorial involvement" in securing presence of key witness against defendants.  [Added 5/1/07]  --  Dendy v. State, 954 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Judge's disqualification not required based on alleged ex parte communication, but Florida Supreme Court cautions judges to be careful in this area.  [Added 4/20/07]  --  Riechmann v. State, 966 So.2d 298 (Fla. 2007).

Judge disqualified from presiding over suit, where judge's father had at least an indirect economic interest in the dispute.  [Added 4/13/07]  --  Corie v. City of Riviera Beach, 954 So.2d 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Motion to disqualify judge from presiding over postconviction proceeding based on allegedly vindictive sentence imposed at trial timely if raised at first opportunity in postconviction proceeding (and was legally sufficient).  [Added 4/9/07]  --  St. Pierre v. State, 966 So.2d 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Judge disqualified from presiding over violation of probation proceeding based on statement that could create well grounded fear that judge predetermined sentence.  [Added 4/7/07]  --  Dorch v. State, 952 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Judge's statement in one case allegedly likening defendant to Charles Manson does not require judge's disqualification in other case involving defendant, absent showing of judge's actual bias.  [Added 3/21/07]  --  Howard v. State, 950 So.2d 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

Trial judge who commented regarding possible suitability of death penalty in case involving 65-year old defendant is disqualified.  [Added 2/26/07]  --  State v. Ballard, 956 So.2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA, 2007).

Judge who is beneficiary of land trust disqualified from cases involving co-beneficiary lawyers (and their law firms); consequently, judge should divest self of interest in trust.  [Added 2/13/07]  --  Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-02.

Part-time traffic magistrates may rent space from law firm that handles traffic cases, but may not work on firm's cases without incurring disqualification.  [Added 1/30/07]  --  Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-01.

Judge who prosecuted defendant years ago should not rule on defendant's postconviction motions.  [Added 12/20/06]  --  Penoyer v. State, 945 So.2d 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Successor judge who replaced recused judge not required to reconsider rulings made by recused judge.  [Added 12/8/06]  --  Rath v. Network Marketing, L.C., 944 So.2d 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

When trial court decides judicial disqualification motion on grounds other than timeliness, then issue of timeliness is not properly before reviewing appellate court.  [Added 12/3/06]  --  Santa Catalina Townhomes, Inc. v. Mirza, 942 So.2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (en banc).

Judge disqualified for statements concerning party that judge made in previous, unrelated case.  [Added 12/1/06]  --  B.M. v. State, 943 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee renders 2 opinions concerning judge's disqualification when law firm employing judge's son appears in cases involving judge.  [Added 11/9/06]  --  Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2006-26; Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2006-27.

Judge's public statement against domestic violence not legally sufficient ground for disqualification in criminal case, per Florida Supreme Court.  [Added 11/2/06]  --  Rodgers v. State, 948 So.2d 655 (Fla. 2006).

Judge's expression of frustration with lawyer's attempts to withdraw from difficult client was not legally sufficient reason for judge's disqualification.  [Added 10/24/06]  --  Fondura v. State, 940 So.2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Untimely and otherwise legally insufficient motion to disqualify trial judge nevertheless results in disqualification due to judge's comments in ruling on motion.  [Added 8/23/06]  --  Dominguez v. State, 944 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Trial judge's 18-month delay in rendering final judgment not legally sufficient ground for disqualification.  [Added 7/13/06]  --  Rawson v. UMLIC VP, L.L.C., 933 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Special Master not disqualified for commenting regarding party's actions in court filings.  [Added 7/5/06]  --  Pasteur Medical Center, Inc. v. Wellcare of Florida, Inc., 943 So.2d 144 (Fla. 2006).

Judge's "vented frustration" comments at one party do not require disqualification.  [Added 6/14/06]  --  St. Fleur v. St. Fleur, 929 So.2d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Judge who personally represented party to case before her during time period incident at issue occurred is disqualified.  [Added 5/19/06]  --  Brown v. Graham, 931 So.2d 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

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